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The Age of Unreason may become an Age of Greatness 
-- Charles Handy, The Age of Unreason 
INTRODUCTION 
These days we frequently hear the term corporate culture. This 
seems to imply that business has some form of cultural force; 
but the history of business activity indicates that the relationship 
between culture and business is one of reflection rather than 
creation: business does not create or shape the surrounding 
culture but rather reflects whatever culture prevails. From the 
street vendors of ancient Babylon to today's multinational 
corporation, the aspirations and attitiudes of those engaged in 
business reflect the aspirations and attitudes of the prevailing 
cultural milieu. Furthermore, the businesses that flourish at any 
given time and in any given place are those that best reflect the 
prevailing characteristics of the existing culture. Specifically, it 
is the managers within these flourishing businesses who reflect 
these characteristics. 
For example, in a recent article in the Financial Times entitled 
"More Top Shell Jobs For Women" (Tuesday, January 13, 1998, 
p. 17), Robert Cozine notes the following: "Royal Dutch-Shell, 
one of the world's largest oil companies, plans to shake up its 
tradition-bound corporate culture by increasing the number of 
women and range of nationalities in its top management tier". 
The main reason for this shake up is that the "narrowness of 
Shell's senior management base has been cited by critics as one 
reason why it has struggled with rapid change in its business. 
Critics point to the controversy over the scrapping of the Brent 
Spar oil rig and Shell's problems with human rights in Nigeria. 
They say a broader management base might have helped Shell 
to respond more effectively to those issues" (currently only 4 
percent of Shell's 400 senior managers are women). In short, 
culture changes continually but Shell's culture in recent years 
has not: its male Anglo management structure reflected the 
cultural values of thirty years ago, but not the values of today. 
The broad challenge of business management, therefore, is to 
develop an ability to read and interpret these often subtle 
cultural shifts, and to understand how these shifts impact the 
role of business in society. 
The central premise of this paper is that business reflects 
culture. Building from this premise I address two basic 
questions. First, what will be the prevailing culture of the 
twenty-first century? Second, how is this culture going to be 
reflected in the attitudes and aspirations of business 
management? In answering the first question I identify the 
dominant culture of the tweny-first century as that embraced by 
the general label of postmodernism. Hence, in answering the 
second question I label the manager of the twenty-first century 
the postmodern manager. The primary characteristic of the 
postmodern manager, which distinguishes this individual from 
the modern manager, is the former's view of business as 
primarily an indeterminate aesthetic activity, rather than the 
characteristically modern view of business as a determinate 
technical enterprise. 
THE UNIVERSES OF BUSINESS 
As a means of distinguishing the modern from the postmodern 
manager, imagine three parallel business contexts or universes. 
These contextual universes are identical except for the moral 
orientation of the managers therein. In one universe managers 
adhere precisely to the ontology of financial-economics: they 
pursue personal material wealth maximization in a logical, 
consistent, and unremitting fashion: they are homo economicus. 
I term this universe the Technical Universe. 
In the second universe managers are also instrumentally rational 
in the sense that they apply logic and reason in the pursuit of 
some goal. However their goal is not strictly personal material 
wealth maximization. They are morally enlightened and thus 
temper their personal material aspirations in deference to some 
moral principle. They may, for example, substitute societal 
material wealth maximization for personal wealth maximization, 
or they may restrict their actions to those that will most benefit 
the materially least advantaged, or they may act only on the 
basis of universalizable moral principles such as some 
conception of fairness or justice. These managers are still 
rational in the sense that they apply logic and reason, and indeed 
they may on occasion act in a way that is indistinguishable from 
the managers in the Technical Universe. These moral managers, 
however, because of their belief in some overiding moral 
principle, cannot be relied upon to act in ways that are 
predictable in financial-economic theory. This is not to say that 
the behavior of these managers would not be predictable, once 
their moral principles were made clear. Indeed the fact that these 
managers still act in ways governed by logic and reason will 
make their behavior as predictable as those managers who 
comprise the Technical Universe. The essential difference, 
therefore, between the technical managers and the moral 
managers will be that the latter pursue goals and are subject to 
constraints that may be more nuanced and ethereal than the 
straightforward wealth-maximization goals of the technicians; 
just as invocations of the technician can be found in financial-
economic theory, invocations of this moral manager can be 
found in the dictates of business-ethics theory. I term this 
second universe the Moral Universe. 
The third and final universe that I wish to conjure is the most 
opaque. It is a universe that we in modernity are least familiar 
with because the actions of managers therein are not governed 
by notions of scientific logic or instrumental rationality. 
Managers in this universe recognise the need for material profit, 
and they are cognisant of the conventional rules and logic of the 
Moral Universe, however they do not view these reason-based 
enterprises as ultimate objectives. These, what I call 'aesthetic' 
managers pursue a goal that is hard to define in modern English. 
Indeed to even call it a goal may be missleading, for these 
managers recognise their universe as essentially one of chaotic 
dissorder and unpredictability where rules of logic and 
rationality will never fit comfortably. These managers endeavor 
to achieve some sort of aesthetic balance and harmony in their 
chaotic environment. In this endeavor they are assisted by 
certain conceptions of the good life, and by conceptions of 
desirable character traits that may lead to this good life. The 
acquisition of these character traits and the concomitant pursuit 
of the good life is not achieved simply by the application of 
certain rules of logic, or of rationality. Indeed the whole pursuit 
is characterized by a marked absence of rules and set goals. It is, 
to all intents and purposes, an aesthetic pursuit. At one time a 
manager's actions may be governed by economic interest, but at 
other times it may be governed by compassion, or courage, or a 
conception of the beautiful or harmonious. Thus unlike the 
previous two universes, the managers in this universe exhibit 
more complex and multifariuos behavioral patterns. Their goal 
is not easily defined, if indeed it can be viewed in terms of a 
singular goal, and the means by which they pursue this elusive 
goal are not easily categorized either. In essence their behavior 
lies outside conventional logic or rationality. They pursue a type 
of aesthetic truth or beauty. Or, to put it another way, they 
pursue a point in their lives where the truth and beauty 
converge. I term this universe the Aesthetic Universe. 
My essential thesis in this article is that business management 
exists and has always existed in all three of these universes. 
Every business manager is and has always been to a greater or 
lesser degree a technician, a moralist, and an aesthete. What has 
varied over time and between place is the extent to which one or 
more of these universes dominates the others. The dominance of 
any one of these three universes is generally determined by the 
encompassing cultural milieu. Crises in business management 
generally develop when the universe in which management 
believes it resides conflicts with that of the surrounding society. 
To a large degree, therefore, successful management entails the 
ability to perceive and predict the prevailing cultural conception 
of business. In short, business reflects culture. As Jean Staune 
observes: "The vision of the world and the vision of mankind 
which prevail in a society have a determining influence on 
social and economic organization" (1996, p. 145). 
As we enter the twenty-first century, a Western corporate 
culture is becoming ever more geographically omnipresent. At 
the same time, however, the epistemological bedrock of this 
culture is crumbling. From its inception in the reformation and 
rennaisance, Western corporate culture has been the child of the 
age of reason. All the facets of modern business -- economics, 
rule-based or consequence-based ethics, science, technology -- 
are products of this reason-based instrumental rationality. The 
foundation of modern business is reason. But Western corporate 
culture itself, as with any culture, evolves and changes. In 
attempting to respond to this evolution and change, managers 
are continually confronted with the limitations of any fixed 
notion of reason; rationality itself evolves and shifts definitional 
emphasis between the Technical, Moral, and Aesthetic 
Universes. For example, when senior management at Royal 
Dutch Shell recently decided to establish a division within the 
company whose sole purpose was to monitor environmental and 
human-rights issues, this was a response to a broader cultural 
shift. This decision by Shell's management was no doubt 
financially justifiable given Shell's recent public relations 
dissasters concerning -- in the case of the environment -- its 
decision to dump an obsolete oil platform in the mid-Atlantic; a 
decision that was reversed in the wake of public outrage. And in 
the case of human rights, Shell suffered and is still suffering 
negative publicity for its tacit support of the opressive regime in 
the north African country of Nigeria: a country in which Shell 
has a substantial oil interest. So, given the above public relations 
dissasters and the concomitant economic cost, Shell's decision 
clearly exists within the Technical Universe of financial 
rationality. But it does not exist entirely within this single 
universe. Shell's recent concern for the environment and human 
rights also reflects a broader cultural shift into the Moral and 
Aesthetic Universes. Shell's management is forced to recognise 
that -- as with all modern multinationals -- this massive oil 
company can no longer be run as a purely economic enterprise; 
it must, to some extent at least, be run as a moral and aesthetic 
enterprise also. Indeed, the much better public relations image 
of, for example, British Petroleum, is a direct result of BP's 
early recognition of this broader socio-cultural shift: BP's 
operations in Columbia are as potentially sensitive, in terms of 
human rights, as Shell's in Nigeria, but unlike Shell, BP's 
management has from the outset been careful to distance itself 
from the morally-questionable Columbian national government. 
Returning to Shell, its most recent oil drilling activities in the 
jungles of Peru is apparently the very model of environmental 
and cultural sensitivity: rather than cutting a road through the 
jungle to its oil installations, Shell is, at great expense, flying in 
and out all supplies. Thus there is no simple formula, either 
financial or moral, for these oil giants: this once again reflects 
the essentially aesthetic nature of tenty-first century postmodern 
management. 
In the soft-drinks industry, PepsiCo has recently suffered a 
public relations disaster that resulted in it severing all ties with 
Burma, a country currently controlled by a military junta. 
Pepsi's interests in Burma were no doubt financially justifiable 
initially, but Pepsi failed to realize that financial justifiability is 
not sufficient in today's cultural milieu. More specifically, Pepsi 
failed to realize that financial justification is itself a function of 
pricing factors -- such as human rights -- that by no means lend 
themselves easily to incorporation into a financial analysis. 
Nike, the athletic apparel manufacturer, is having similar 
experiences with its (economically rational) policy of targeting 
certain developing countries as locations for shoe assembly. In 
essence, Pepsi, Shell, and Nike tried to remain predominantly 
economic institutions within a culture that increasingly finds 
acceptable only predominantly moral and aesthetic institutions 
vis-a-vis the Moral and Aesthetic Universes. 
The recent experiences of these multinationals are not unusual. 
In fact, as any perusal of a business newspaper will reveal, they 
are typical. We in Western corporate culture are in the midst of 
a shift in the metaphysical universe of business: we are 
experiencing an epistemological crisis, a paradigm shift in our 
conception of ratioanlity and reason in business enterprise. More 
precisely, we in the West are becoming increasingly unsure of 
the exact nature of reason. Whose reason? What is the reason 
behind reason? These are questions that would have had little 
relevance to nineteenth-century industrialists. Their mono-
cultural, protestant-ethic, encyclopaedic bedrock was solid. 
Twenty-first century business culture, however, is characterized, 
not by Victorian self-confidence, but by radical self-questioning. 
Indeed, in contrast to the recent epochs of the age of reason and 
of self-confidence, the West of the next millenium promises to 
be an age of self-doubt and self-questioning. Staune sums up 
this transition by noting that: 
one of the great events of the end of the twentieth century is 
that, in all the disciplines of science, a new vision is emerging. 
Behind the study of the foundations of matter, the origin of the 
universe, behind the experiments studying how man's 
consciousness works, behind the playing out of the evolution of 
life appears a certain depth to reality. One can scientifically 
show that 'what is' cannot be reduced to an objective, material 
and measurable level. [1996, p. 146] 
In the broader cultural milieu this approach of the age of self-
questioning and self-doubt is reflected in the philosophy and 
sociology of poststructuralism and postmodernism. These 
philosophies challenge the bedrock of modernity by 
deconstructing many of the constructs upon which modernism is 
built: constructs such as truth, reason, and logic. Although 
coming to prominance in the late twentieth century, 
postmodernism gained much of its impetus from the writings of 
Freidrich Nietzsche in the nineteenth century. Nietzsche 
challenged the assumed certainties of his era by arguing that 
there is no absolute truth or absolute moral good. Concepts such 
as truth and good are merely weapons used by society and 
individuals in their continual will to power: "This world is the 
will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are 
also this will to power -- and nothing besides!" (WP, 1967). For 
Nietzsche, at least in his earlier writings, the only absolute was 
this will to power, although -- in true postmodernist fashion -- 
Nietzsche is equivocal even about this. For example, in his 
analysis of Nietzschian morality, Brian Leiter states: "I doubt 
whether a good argument can even be made out that 'will to 
power' provides Nietzsche with his standard of value" (1997, p. 
267, footnote 40). Leiter suggests that Nietzsche criticizes the 
universal application of everyday moral dictums on the grounds 
that such application will stifle those few individuals capable of 
real creativity and excellence. Thus Nietzsche does not construct 
some alternative value system but merely deconstructs the 
modern notion of universal everyday morality. In essence, 
therefore, Nietzsche's universal moral principle is that there is 
no universal moral principle: true morality is an absence of 
morality; a quintessentially postmodern stance. Nietzsche's 
critique of the assumed self-evident truths of modernism 
augered our current age of radical uncertainty. Indeed, the 
essence of Neitzsche's critique of modernity is reflected in the 
writings of all contemporary postmodernists. For example, the 
title of Alasdair MacIntyre's 1988 book really says it all: Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?. 
Returning to our three business universes. The first two, those of 
the technical and moral, were products of reason. They reflect 
modernity as defined by the Enlightenment economic and moral 
philosophers, most notably Adam Smith in his two master-
works The Theory of Moral Sentimants (1759), and, An Enquiry 
Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). 
These works presaged and explained the industrial revolution 
and the rise of capitalism as economic expressions of the 
modernist principles of prudent reason and instrumental 
rationality. Smith saw no inherent conflict between what I have 
termed here the Moral and Technical universes. For him both 
were complimentary facets of the modernist metaphysic. 
Business may have existed comfortably in these two universes 
in the last two centuries; business of the twenty-first century 
will, however, no longer reside in these universes. The coming 
age of self-doubt will necessitate business moving to a different 
universe, a postmodern universe. Management will have to 
make this shift also. It will be a shift in management paradigm. 
The management universe of the tweny-first century will be 
neither a technical universe nor a moral universe, indeed it will 
be no reason-based universe. The dominant business culture will 
be a rekindling of a culture of business that was all but entirely 
eclipsed in the industrial revolution. In the age beyond reason, in 
the epoch of self-doubt, the manager will become the 
postmodern aesthete. 
For the first time since the inception of modernity, that is for the 
first time in some three-hundred years in the West, the manager-
as-aesthete will dominate. So, for example, Pepsi's management 
realized finally that their decision to pull out of Burma in 
January of 1997 could not be successfully made by applying 
financial theory, or by applying some moral dictum, it could 
only be made aesthetically; in having to make a decision not 
based on either financial theory or moral theory, Pepsi's 
management were forced into the postmodern world. But why 
exactly did the Technical and Moral Universes prove ineffectual 
for Pepsi in making this decision? 
A BRIEF DECONSTRUCTION OF THE TECHNICAL 
UNIVERSE 
With the possible exception of the latter third of the twentieth 
century, when the moral manager has gained prominance, the 
dominant management paradigm of modernity has undoubtedly 
been the manager as technician. This manager as technician 
exists within the metaphysic of what I term here the Technical 
Universe. This Technical Universe finds its justification in the 
theory and empirics of financial-economic theory. Indeed this 
manager as technician is purely the practical manifestation of 
the theoretically rational agent of financial economics: the 
wealth maximizer, the opportunist, the logician. But who 
exactly is this person? We must never lose sight of the fact that 
the manager is a person. So what type of person is the rational 
agent of financial-economic theory? 
A priori, we might reasonably expect that if nothing else at least 
this agent will be profoundly rational, where rationality would 
be defined in an instrumental, that is to say modernist, sense. 
Instrumental rationality is what designates the manager as 
technician, it is the essence of financial-economic theory, so 
surely the rational pursuit of rational objectives will characterize 
this person. But does it? 
When we look closely at this manager as technician. When we 
deconstruct this construction of financial-economic theory we 
find something that is unexpected. This rational agent, who has 
the rational objective of personal material advancement, never 
actually achieves this objective. Indeed, more significantly, it is 
the very nature of the rationality adopted that ensures that this 
rational agent can never rationally achieve his or her rational 
objective (Dobson, 1996). 
Thus, in short, financial-economic theory makes the odd 
assumption that rational agents rationally choose a rationality 
construct that ensures that they can never rationally achieve the 
rationally determined objective. Simply put, the goal of wealth 
maximization or some variant thereof, as conjured by financial-
economic theory, and as adopted by our manager-as-technician, 
is subtly self-defeating. This pursuit of wealth maximization 
never achieves maximum wealth either for the individual agent 
or for the group of agents who comprise the Technical Universe. 
Elsewhere I have termed this phenomenon the finance paradox, 
for it is indeed paradoxical that a rational individual or group of 
individuals would knowingly adopt a mode of reasoning and 
behavior -- namely opportunism -- that they rationally know will 
render them incapable of achieving their a priori stated 
objective: to maximize their material wealth or, if they are risk-
averse or effort-averse, their utility of wealth. 
Furthermore, financial-economic theory in the guise of the 
technician has always claimed that this opportunistic pursuit of 
wealth together with the firm-wide implication of it, namely 
shareholder-wealth maximization, is value neutral. By 'value' 
here is meant moral value: financial economics has always had a 
self-conception as a moral-free-zone, exempt from the vagueries 
of moral philosophy. The careful deconstruction undertaken 
below, however, will reveal that financial-economic theory is 
not value free. It possesses an implicit moral agenda. 
In the case of individual opportunism, financial economics 
defends its theories as morally free by either just tacitly 
accepting opportunism as a simplifying assumption (real 
behavior is too complex to model), or as just tacitly accepting 
such behavior as natural (a sort of tacit application of some 
variant of social Darwinism). In the case of the first justification, 
it is noteworthy that this acceptance of opportunism as a 
simplifying assumption is made purely on the basis of the 
latter's mathematical convenience. The mathematical 
modalability of behavior is taken as a primary criterion for 
building a model of the manager. In the context of human 
behavior, 'mathematical', and 'model building' are all 
characteristics peculiar to modernity. 
Thus a managerial universe of pure technicians, where a pure 
technician is an agent who adheres strictly to the tenets of 
financial-economic rationality, will be characterized by 
economic inefficiency and instability in the short-run and likely 
self-destruction in the long-run. More significantly, these are not 
merely the predictions of a postmodern critique. These are the 
predictions of financial-economic theory itself! 
A BRIEF DECONSTRUCTING THE MORAL UNIVERSE 
Consider perhaps the most comprehensive and widely accepted 
business-ethics theory yet developed, namely Integrated Social 
Contracts Theory (ISCT). Donaldson and Dunfee desribe ISCT 
as a "realistic, comprehensive, and global normative theory of 
business ethics .." (1991, p. 32). The theory claims to establish 
certain hypernorms that provide a moral foundation for business 
throughout the world. Essentially these hypernorms all center 
around what we in the West call 'human rights'. In addition to 
the hypernorms, ISCT attempts to preempt any charge of 
Western cultural imperialism by recognising the existance of 
culturally distinct mini-norms. These mini-norms, however, 
according to ISCT are always subject to justification in terms of 
the hypernorms. 
Clearly, if it is to possess any normative bight, ISCT needs the 
hypernorms to be omnipotent. Otherwise, with a multiplicity of 
contradictory and culturally distinct mini-norms, the theory 
would just descend into ethical relativism. But does ISCT live 
up to its claims? Does it provide a normative foundation for a 
global business ethic? Or does it merely project the prejudices of 
Western modernity? 
Surely human rights, however desirable we in the West may feel 
them to be, are a peculiarly Western and more specifically a 
peculiarly 'modernist' phenomenon. Human rights are an 
invention of Enlightenment moral philosophy. To claim human 
rights such as personal freedom, informed consent, and 
ownership of property, as universal and unequivocal 
hypernorms is to claim that Enlightenment moral philosophy 
(whatever exactly that is) has some absolute justification, that it 
is the Truth, the absolute presence. MacIntyre, for example, 
observes "there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with 
belief in witches and in unicorns" (1984, p. 69). He goes on to 
explain this position: 
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such 
rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason 
which we possess for asserting that there are no witches and the 
best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no 
unicorns: every attempt to give good reasons for believing that 
there are such rights has failed. The eighteenth-century 
philosophical defenders of natural rights sometimes suggest that 
the assertions which state that men possess them are self-evident 
truths; but we know that there are no self-evident truths. 
Twentieth-century moral philosophers have sometimes appealed 
to their and our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to 
have learned from the history of moral philosophy is that the 
introduction of the word 'intuition' by a moral philosopher is 
always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an 
argument. [Ibid.] 
In his recent business-ethics text, David Fritszche states that 
"there are certain practices (hypernorms) such as stealing, 
killing, and slavery which are not condoned by any community 
worldwide" (1997, p. 55). Really? I am not familiar with every 
community worldwide, but I am familiar with my own Western 
community, and I could argue that -- given reasonable 
definitions of "stealing", "killing", and "slavery" -- all of these 
are condoned in my community. For example, ask a native 
American whether the West condones stealing. Ask a 
Palestinian, an Iraqi, or even perhaps an African-American 
whether the West condones killing. Ask the animal rights 
activists who have compiled a declaration of primate rights 
whether the West condones slavery. 
In reality, ISCT, like business-ethics-theory in general, suffers 
from all the internal inconsistencies and incoherences 
characteristic of modernity. Simply put, there is no such thing as 
a hypernorm. Ethics is always contextual. As Paul Buller, John 
Kohls, and Kenneth Anderson note in their recent article on 
Cross-Cultural Ethical Conflicts; "a number of recent empirical 
studies provide evidence for different ethical perspectives across 
national cultures on a wide variety of specific issues" (1997, p. 
173). They go on to give numerous examples of such studies. 
They conclude: 
the preponderance of the research to date suggests strongly that 
different national cultures have different perspectives regarding 
ethical values and norms. ..national culture plays a central role 
in shaping moral values and standards of ethical behavior. 
Strong cross-cultural differences make it difficult to develop 
universal moral values, reasoning, and behaviors that will be 
meaningful and adhered to across national boundaries. [1987, 
pp. 173-174] 
The notion of a hypernorm erroneously assumes that the 
Western modernist context is 'the' context. In addition, the 
internal inconsistencies in the theory become apparent when 
attemptrs are made to apply it. For example, consider a recent 
attempt to apply it by David Fritszche. Fritszche considers the 
example of a Western firm doing business in China. Initially he 
notes that "nepotism might be a micro social contract norm in an 
Asian community. Equal opportunity may be a norm in a 
Western community" (p. 45). But then of course would not 
nepotism (or at least the Western definition of it) contradict our 
human-rights induced hypernorm? Later in his discussion of 
ISCT Fritszche states: "Once the [Western] firm has landed a 
contract and begins hiring Chinese employees, it should observe 
equal opportunity norms (the norms of its local [Western] 
community that do not have an adverse effect on the Chinese) in 
its hiring practices" (p. 46). But wait a minute, did we not just 
decide that nepotism was a moral norm in China? So by 
adopting Western hiring practices are we not guilty of precicely 
the moral imperialism that ISCT was supposed to avoid? We are 
in essence saying that our Western hiring practices are in some 
absolute moral sense superior to your Eastern hiring practices, 
which once again broaches the question of from whence this 
absolute moral 'ought' of Western modernity is derived. For 
example, in the case of bribery, Valesquez and Brady note that 
"moral views on bribery appear to be culturally conditioned, and 
in some cultures the absolutist view of the wrongness of bribery 
is perceived as a form of Western cultural imperialism that is 
deeply ethnocentric" (1997, p. 100). Not surprisingly, given its 
existance entirely within the context of modernity, ISCT has no 
answer to this question of justifying the 'ought' of modern 
morality. Indeed its conceptual contextlessness precludes it from 
even realizing this as a meaningful question. 
For example, Donaldson states that "[c]orporations ... exist to 
enhance the welfare of society" (1982, p. 54). But Donaldson 
fails to give a precise definition of this "welfare"; he goes on to 
say "through the satisfaction of consumer and worker interests" 
(ibid.), but what interests exactly, and might these intersts not 
have been created by the corporation in the first place through 
advertising? Which brings us back to the question of how our 
modern manager is going to act so as to maximize overall 
welfare? Who and what is included in overall? What is welfare? 
So, in short, somewhere along the line, before he takes any act, 
our modernist, utilitarian, societal-welfare-maximizing manager 
is just going to have to apply some absolute ought. But from 
whence is the justification for this 'ought' going to come? In 
Against the Self-Images of the Age MacIntyre notes that in 
classical Greek, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon and Middle English, 
the words 'ought' and 'owe' are indistinguishable. The 'ought' of 
the Moral Universe is a type of taboo, or what MacIntyre calls a 
survival: 
We make a social practice intelligible by placing it in some 
context where the point and purpose of doing things in one way 
rather than another is exhibited by showing the connection 
between that social practice and some wider institutional 
arrangements of which it is a part. So the passing of a verdict 
has to be understood in the context of a legal system, and the 
concept of a home run has to be understood in the context of 
baseball. When we cannot make a practice intelligible by 
providing such a context, there are two possibilities. The first is 
that we have not been adequately perceptive or understanding in 
our investigation of that particular social order; the other is that 
the practice just is, as it stands, unintelligible. One hypothesis 
which we may advance as a result of coming to the latter 
conclusion, a hypothesis which has the additional merit, if it is 
independently supported, of supporting the latter conclusion, is 
that the practice in question is a survival. That is to say, we 
explain the practice in its present form by supposing that it is the 
historical product of an earlier practice which existed in a social 
context that has now been removed and of the consequnces of 
the removal of that context. What do I mean by a context? A set 
of beliefs expressed in institutionalized social practice. Hence 
what I want to maintain is that the use of the ... moral "ought" 
can perhaps only be made intelligible as a social practice by 
supposing it to be a survival from a lost context of beliefs, just 
as the eighteenth-century Polynesian use of "taboo" can perhaps 
only be made intelligible by supposing it to be a survival from a 
lost context of beliefs. [1984a, p. 167] 
Indeed even within the Nineteenth century itself this central 
fallibility of the Enlightenemnt 'ought' was recognized, most 
notably by Nietzsche. To illustrate this point in a contemporary 
business context, consider the following example. A skillful 
financial accountant may be able to enhance her company's 
reported results of operations by crafting a sale-leaseback 
arrangement whereby some of the company's assets are sold, a 
gain is recorded, all the appropriate accounting pronouncements 
are adhered to, and the company still has use of its assets. The 
intent of the transaction was never to rid the company of 
unwanted assets, but rather to record a gain and thus possibly 
avoid breaching debt-covenant agreements or circumvent 
regulatory requirements. A recent example of a major 
corporation adopting this practice is IBM during its financial 
crisis of the early 1990s. IBM attempted to artificially bolster its 
financial statements by undertaking major sale and leaseback 
arrangements. It rapidly dropped the practice in the face of 
critical public scrutiny. 
In order to examine whether or not this example of creative 
accounting is unethical, traditional approaches would have the 
individual step out of her accounting role and don the hat of a 
Kantian (e.g., "does this action violate the rights of users of the 
financial statements to fairly presented financial information?"), 
or of a utilitarian (e.g., "does this action maximize the welfare of 
all stakeholders?"). In this traditional approach, therefore, a 
professional - whether accountant or otherwise - adopts a type of 
moral schizophrenia in which being a good professional in the 
sense of being an economically effective accountant becomes 
separable from being a good professional in the sense of being 
an ethical accountant. Thus, an accountant could be a 'good' 
accountant, in the sense of being very efficient and effective, yet 
at the same time not be a 'good' accountant, in the sense of being 
ethical. 
Similarly, statements such as "You 'ought' to be an ethical 
accountant!" become problematic. Clearly, given the 
aforementioned separation of ethics and efficiency, such a 
command of 'ought' cannot be premised on the idea that being 
an ethical accountant will in some way engender greater 
efficiency. If one were to challenge this command with the 
question, "Why 'ought' I to be an ethical accountant?", the 
modernist approach to ethics would have trouble providing a 
simple answer beyond "You ought to be an ethical accountant 
because being ethical is what accountants ought to be", which 
clearly does not really answer the original question. Given this 
dual concept of the 'good' professional, therefore, it is not 
surprising that many practitioners feel confused. They may find 
themselves being simultaneously tugged in two opposing 
directions: in the direction of economic efficiency or profit 
maximization, and in the direction of adherence to some abstract 
professional code of conduct; some abstract 'ought' of the Moral 
Universe. 
A BRIEF CONSTRUCTION OF THE AESTHETIC 
UNIVERSE 
To find the postmodern manager we must in fact seek out the 
premodern manager. I use the term 'artisan' to label the manager 
as aesthete; this is a premodern term and it labels a certain type 
of individual. An artisan is an individual engaged in business, 
but the individual's conception of business, and in particular the 
individual's conception of the Good of business, is very different 
to that of the modern manager. 
The artisan views business as an art or craft in which the 
primary pursuit is of a certain type of excellence. The goal is not 
material gain or adherence to some rationality-founded moral 
dogma. Indeed, as the term 'art' implies, the postmodern 
manager pursues primarily nothing that is materially measurable 
or empirically observable. That is not to say that this pursuit is 
non-moral, for this excellence is also The Good. This pursuit 
may also be characterized by the generation of substantial 
material wealth. But neither morality nor material wealth define 
this excellence or Good. So what exactly is it? 
I mentioned that to find the postmodern manager empirically we 
must look to the premodern manager; and indeed it is in the 
metaphysics of the premoderns that a definition of our 
Excellence or Good can be found. Fortunately for our purposes 
this premodern metaphysic has been made more 
comprehendable to us moderns by the resurgence of classical 
Greek philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century. This 
resurgence is undoubtedly due in no small measure to the 
epistemological crises of modernity described above; the 
resurgence generally comes under the nomenclature of 'virtue 
ethics'. 
So to describe the essence of the manager of the postmodern era 
we look to the managers, cratsmen, and artisans of the 
premodern era; so we return again to a pre-industrial, pre-
factory, village-based business concept, albeit one based today 
on remote-access computer technology rather than the potter's 
wheel or spinning loom. The postmodern manager may work 
with different tools than the premodern, but the essential view of 
human activity as an artistic pursuit or craft, as an excellence, 
will be rekindled in the postmodern business era. Virtue ethics 
theory represents an avenue by which to make this transition 
from modernism to postmodernism in a business context (see 
Solomon, 1992). Virtue ethics theory can thus be viewed as a 
type of translation mechanism. 
One defining characteristic of the postmodern manager, 
emphasized particularly in virtue ethics theory, is an holistic 
approach to decisionmaking. In modernist approaches, the 
economic and the moral are seen as entirely seperable. A 
manager can make, for example a capital budgeting decision, 
either on the basis of economic criteria such as the net-present-
value (NPV), or on the basis of moral criteria such as integrated-
social-contracts-theory (ISCT). But these two methods are 
entirely epistemologically seperate; there is a dualism here so 
familiar to modernity. The internal crises in the Universes of the 
technician and the moralist are reflected in the deconstructions 
of the ontological foundations of these concepts as intellectual 
modes of enquiry; specifically what is being deconstructed are 
those prejudices and illusions that defined the dualism between 
the economic notion of the manager-as-technician and the 
modern philosophical notion of the manager-as-moralist. The 
postmodern critique reveals these two heretofore seperate 
ontologies as just two fragile and contextual metaphysical 
stances. This realization within the academic cloisters of 
economics and ethics is leading first to radical self-doubt, and 
second to radical re-orientation among -- in the current context -
- business management theorists and practitioners. In essence 
what financial economics and moral philosophy are 
experiencing are paradigm shifts. Interestingly, the nature of 
these paradigm shifts are not dissimilar in that they both reflect 
a conceptual broadening unfamiliar to modernism -- 
characterized as modernism is by identification and 
compartmentalization -- but very familier to postmodernism in 
general and virute-ethics theory in particular. 
Undoubtedly my invocation of this manager-as-aesthete 
highlights the limitations of the manager-as-technician. But it in 
no way discredits the application of finance theory to business 
providing that the limitations of the latter are recognised. Capital 
budgeting methods such as the net-present-value rule, although 
analytically rigourous, are in no way antithetical to our 
postmodern manager. This manager-as-aesthete will still employ 
capital budgeting and other technical methods, but will view 
these as just one means of making a decision: decisions such as 
Pepsi's concerning Burma, or Shell's concerning its activities in 
Nigeria. The postmodern manager will recognize the aesthetic 
value judgements that underlie the analytics of capital 
budgeting: judgements such as the time frame assumed, the 
assumptions underlying cash-flow estimates and discount-rate 
estimates, the assumptions of time-value-of-money and 
reinvestment inherent in this type of analysis. All these will be 
recognised by the postmodern manager as forming the context 
of the analysis, and this context will be taken as just one 
possible context from which to make a decision. 
So the postmodern manager's prerogative, albeit complex and 
multi-faceted, is in no way a purely chaotic, unstructured, and 
futile one; this manager is just no longer labouring under the 
illusion that decisions can be made correctly purely on the basis 
of technical or moral criteria. In pursuing these ellusive internal 
goods of the Aesthetic Universe, the postmodern manager 
recognizes the need to excercise judgement in weighing the 
many considerations -- economic, moral, and aesthetic -- that go 
into sound decisionmaking. More precisely, the postmodern 
manager merely realizes that any desision criterion, even 
something as apparently cut-and-dry as the net-peresent-value 
rule, is in reality at root just another aesthetic context from 
which to view the art of business. 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding their seminal work on the theory of the firm, 
Jensen and Meckling note that "whatever its shortcomings, the 
corporation has thus far survived the market test against 
potential alternatives" (1976, p. 357). This statement has since 
been further vindicated by recent developments in eastern 
Europe and the republics that once comprised the Soviet Union. 
We exit the twentieth century with the market system 
increasingly omnipresent, auguring a global corporate culture. 
Thus when viewed within the Technical Universe, the story of 
the firm-as-competitive-enterprise is undoubtedly a story of 
success. From the aesthetic perspective, however, there are other 
universes or contexts. Success in the technical universe is 
merely a prerequisite for entry into the aesthetic universe. This 
aesthetic context is, according to Aristotle, obscured by the 
technical paradigm where excellence is equated with efficiency 
in achieving solely material ends. The latter is a paradigm that is 
oblivious to the intrinsic value of the aesthetic universe: in 
economic-game-theory for example there is no virtue, no 
internal good, no craftsmanship or excellence save in the name 
of effectiveness, no communal purpose. In the competitive game 
of economic self-interest, truth and good become subservient to 
profit. Individuals -- and even ostensibly non-economic 
institutuions such as universities -- shift their allegiance, from 
truth and good, to profit: 
In the Republic, Plato implicitly and explicitly argues that 
materialism is the source of many of our moral ills. If one's 
value system is essentially materialistic, it encourages us to 
cheat, lie, steal, and the like, for if we can get away with such 
actions, we will be materialistically better off. [Klein, 1989, p. 
62] 
When Aristotle described life's ideal as one of intellectual 
pursuit or contemplative enquiry, he accepted that the material 
wealth of his society was sufficient for only a small fraction of 
its inhabitants to realize this ideal. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, wealth generated by the firm through the 
market system has freed the majority of humanity from the 
fetters of material servitude. But the victory has been Pyrrhic. 
To the extent that the aesthetic universe has been eclipsed in 
modernity by the game-theoretic technical universe, the fetters 
of material servitude have merely been replaced by those of 
aesthetic impoverishment. The tragedy of modern corporate 
culture is thus the tragedy of King Midas. In creating the means 
for unlimited material acquisition, we may have prevented 
ourselves from acquiring those non-material goods that we most 
desire. 
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